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How Radical Are the Implications of Properzi’s
Christ-Centered Perspective on Emotion for Psychology
and Psychotherapy?
Jeffrey S. Reber
University of West Georgia

Properzi offers a perspective on emotion that is radically different from traditional secular theories
of emotion and the psychotherapy approaches associated with those theories, but perhaps his Christcentered perspective is even more radical than he perceives it. If it is strongly theistic and strongly
relational, as it appears to be, then its implications would significantly alter the psychology of emotion
and psychotherapy. These implications need to be explicated so it is clear what a Christ-centered perspective on emotion would mean to the discipline. I have fleshed out three radical implications regarding
scope, relational ontology, and mastery discourse to demonstrate how significantly Properzi’s perspective would alter the psychology of emotion and emotion-focused psychotherapies if it is as theistic and
relational as it seems to be.
Keywords: theism, relationality, emotions, Christ-centered

H

aving focused much of my professional career
on the relationship between faith, religion, and
psychology, I am grateful for the opportunity to write
a response to Properzi’s very intriguing article. Properzi’s work is timely, and his corrective to a growing
emotionalism in Western society is critically needed.
He rightly implicates, I believe, several problematic
ontological assumptions in the secular psychological
theories of emotion, including a long-standing mastery discourse that presumes a dichotomy between
the rational and the emotional—and a necessary ascendancy of one over the other; an individualistic conception of identity that locates emotion (and reason)
within the unique, bounded self; and a postmodern
penchant for relativism that centers truth in the radically autonomous self and—more precisely—in one’s
personal feelings. His challenge of these assumptions
offers a genuine and much-needed alternative understanding of emotion through a Christ-centered perspective on emotions, identity, and truth. Locating

emotions, identity, and truth in our relationship with
a living, embodied being who is “the way, the truth,
and the life” (Properzi, 2018, p. 5) has radical, altering implications for the psychology of emotions and
psychotherapy. I greatly appreciate the way in which
Properzi critically compares and contrasts the secular
and Christ-centered approaches to emotion in this
very thoughtful paper particularly because his analysis
shows how drastically different naturalistic and theistic conceptions of psychological phenomena can be.
In my own work I have examined the extent to
which a theistic approach to psychology might contribute to the advancement of knowledge within a
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discipline that has predominately treated God as being
at most an add-on assumption to naturalistic explanations (Slife & Reber, 2009; Slife, Reber, & Lefevor,
2012). By centering emotions, identity, and truth in
Christ, Dr. Properzi’s (2018) paper clearly does not
treat God as merely added-on. On the contrary, his
perspective asserts that “emotions cannot transcend or
be separated from Christ” (p. 5) and, as such, appears
to fit comfortably within a theistic worldview, which,
in contrast to a naturalistic worldview, assumes that
the current activity of God is a necessary condition
for psychological phenomena (Reber & Slife, 2013b).
I use the verb “appears” here because, although in
Properzi’s perspective on emotions God is clearly important and may even be essential, the full scope of
God’s necessity is unclear and the radical implications
that would follow from this idea that God currently
takes an active role in emotions are not fully fleshed
out. My intention in this response is to explicate for
consideration by Properzi and the broader audience of
his paper a few of the radical implications that would
follow from the inclusion of God as a necessary condition of emotion.

Dr. Properzi’s (2018) paper appears to assert something quite different. From Properzi’s perspective,
“emotions cannot transcend or be separated from
Christ, they can only be integrated into a wider system
of reality that centers on Him” (p. 5). On this account,
naturalistic explanations of emotion are not only inadequate, but they are also ultimately wrong—and
not just for Christians, but apparently for all people.
I write “apparently” again in quotation marks here because Properzi leaves the scope of his Christ-centered
perspective unclear. Throughout the paper, as in the
previous quote, he makes broad ontological claims
about Christ and emotions, identity and God (e.g., p.
5), and truth and Christ (e.g., p. 9) without any qualification unique to Christians. Yet at other points in
the paper Properzi seems to delimit the applicability
of the Christ-centered perspective to Christians. He
states, for example, that “Christian therapists that have
an established relationship of safety and trust with
Christian clients [emphasis added] . . . could explore
the status of this particular spiritual orientation and
emphasize its importance for overall emotional wellbeing” (p. 11). He also asserts that “Jesus’ claim to be
the Son of God has powerful and radical implications
for all who desire to follow Him [emphasis added]” (p. 5;
see also p. 7 and 10).
It is unclear whether this ambiguity concerning
the scope of Properzi’s Christ-centered perspective
reflects any hesitation with asserting its universal necessity. Perhaps Properzi is aware of the divisiveness
stereotypically associated with theistic religions, and
he wants to avoid the appearance of proselytizing or
claiming Christianity’s superiority to other faith traditions. If so, such a concern would not be unique to
Properzi. Many psychologists omit discussion of their
personal faith and its relevant precepts in their scholarship to avoid any hint of religious bias. Some editors
of journals on psychology and religion disallow any
inclusion of theistic approaches to psychology in the
articles they publish because they have “strong feelings
about theistic psychology” (Park, 2017, sect. “Values
of the Journal,” para. 1) compromising the objectivity of empirical science. As a result, they deem papers
that employ “theological constructs” in explaining
psychological phenomena “inappropriate” (Piedmont,
2009, p. 1) for their journals. Similarly, some critics
of theistic approaches to psychology, foremost among

Radical Implication 1:
The Christ-Centered Perspective Would Apply
to the Emotions of All People

The worldviews of naturalism and theism assume
very different ontologies. Naturalism assumes that
only natural entities, events, and causes are necessary
for explanation (Papineau, 2007). Consequently, naturalistic theories of emotion tend to posit a materialcausal process or mechanism that operates according
to natural laws, as in Darwin’s assertion that emotions,
like other traits, evolve according to the law of natural
selection through the mechanism of inheritance (later
to become genetics). Some naturalists would allow
for the added assumption that God originally created
or put in place the natural laws and mechanisms that
now govern the evolution and expression of emotions,
as in some forms of deistic theology (Slife & Reber,
2009). However, allowing God’s inclusion in this way
gives God no bearing on the explanation, prediction,
or control of emotions presently because God is not
currently involved. Thus, the naturalistic explanation
is taken to be sufficient (De Caro & Macarthur, 2010).
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them Daniel Helminiak (2010, 2017), assert that theistic approaches to psychology are based on personal
religious beliefs, biases, and agendas that threaten to
undermine objective science.
Given these concerns, Properzi could reasonably expect that his article would raise a number of questions
about his seemingly universal claims that Christ plays
a necessary role in emotions, identity, and truth. Readers may wonder: “If emotions are inseparable from
God, why must God be the Christian God?” Or they
might query, “If, as Properzi asserts, the Christian God
is the necessary God of emotions, then does that mean
psychologists must convert to Christianity or at least
act as if Christianity is true for the sake of theorizing,
conducting research, and practicing psychotherapy in
relation to emotions?” They could also ask, “Would
this Christ-centered perspective exclude and potentially discriminate against other theistic perspectives,
such as Islamic or Jewish theistic conceptions of emotions, identity, and truth?”
These are reasonable questions, and it is completely
fair and necessary to ask them of Properzi or of any
advocate of a theistic approach. What is not fair, however, is assuming that these kinds of questions apply
only or primarily to the theistic approach. Quite the
contrary, questions like these apply to all worldviews,
including scientists’ vaunted naturalism. In naturalism’s, case many laypeople and some scientists mistakenly take for granted the idea that naturalists have
a common and agreed-upon understanding of laws of
nature. In fact, there are many competing conceptions
of natural laws within naturalism, from metaphysical realities that act upon the world to mathematical
descriptions of regularly occurring events to linguistic constructs that have achieved a high level of social
consensus among scientists (Dixon, 2008). Different
naturalistic thinkers take different positions on these
conceptions, and they promote, debate, and test these
positions against each other all the time. Indeed, it is a
hallmark of science that proponents of these different
concepts conduct experiments, publish articles, and
give presentations in an effort to persuade their peers
to accept their competing theories.
Why would we not expect and encourage the same
thing of the various approaches arising out of a theistic worldview? Just as natural scientists take their
conceptions of natural law to be true and promote

them in the marketplace of ideas, so too can theistic
psychologists take different faith positions seriously
and advocate for them strongly in their scholarship.
As a matter of good scientific practice, these competing positions should be debated and tested against each
other as to their capacity to advance knowledge within
the discipline. A monolithic position and wholesale
conversion to it would be unlikely, just as has been the
case within naturalism. However, an enriched, rigorously evaluated, and pluralistically informed theistic
understanding of emotion could emerge that could
in turn be compared, contrasted, and tested against
the various conceptions emerging from a naturalistic
ontology—or from other ontologies—all in pursuit
of furthering productive dialog and the advancement
of the knowledge of emotions within psychology. To
claim that there is something unique to theism that
makes this impossible would be tantamount to an antitheistic prejudice (Slife & Reber, 2009).
If, as it appears, Properzi’s theistic approach assumes that Christ is a necessary condition of emotion for all people, then Properzi ought to take that
stand definitively and own its radical implications.
Other researchers with different theistic perspectives
on emotion, as well as those with different naturalistic perspectives, can and should do likewise. Each of
these scholars can and should challenge and critically
evaluate these competing views rigorously in a shared
endeavor to understand this complex psychological
phenomenon, similar to Properzi’s critical analysis of
secular and Christian perspectives on emotion in this
paper. If, on the other hand, Properzi’s perspective is
not theistic or if it is weakly theistic, as in deism, then
Christ is not currently necessary to the explanation of
emotions for anyone, including Christians—though
Christians might add Christ onto the naturalistic explanation in some inconsequential way. This weakly
theistic approach would take the teeth out of Properzi’s argument that emotions are inseparable from
Christ and that our identities must be swallowed up
in His identity. Finally, if Christ for Properzi is a currently necessary condition for only Christians’ emotions, then a number of theological concerns come
to bear (e.g., as to whether Christ is the life and the
light of the world, the Alpha and Omega, etc.), and
Properzi needs to revise the broader claims he has
made in this paper to reflect this limitation. Moreover,
20
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such a position would suggest that Christians need a
different psychology to explain their emotions than
those of people of other faiths and naturalists. Perhaps Properzi has considered these implications, but
it would be clarifying and helpful if he would share his
position in relation to them more explicitly.

client says, “My wife makes me so mad,” for example,
many therapists train the client to rephrase that statement more atomistically, as in “I feel angry when I observe my wife behaving in x, y, or z way.” Outside of the
therapy office, it has become quite commonplace for
people to use similarly atomistic language regarding
emotions (as well as thoughts and behaviors). When
a sibling teases another child and the child loses his
temper, for example, parents often chasten the child
with these words: “You may not be responsible for
your sibling teasing you, but you are responsible for
your emotional reaction.” The message is clear: “Your
emotions are contained within you, and as a result you
alone are accountable for them.”
Properzi’s (2018) Christ-centered perspective seems
to suggest something radically alternative to atomism,
but here again there is some ambiguity. At some points
in his paper Properzi treats emotions and identity atomistically. He defines emotions as “‘concern-based
construals’ . . . that integrate a number of cognitiveaffective realities in the individual [emphasis added]”
(p. 8). This integrative concept may suggest a less
materialistic perspective, but it still appears to be one
that is self-contained “in the individual.” Further on
he writes of “emotions that emerge within us” (p. 6),
which idea is wholly consistent with secular atomistic psychological theories of emotion. Finally, when
he speaks of aligning personal identity, values, and
actions with Christ’s values and identity (p. 6), it is
reminiscent of correspondence ontologies in which
the alignment of two separate self-contained realities
is the goal, such as the objective world and one’s subjective representation of it.
Yet, at other points in the paper, Properzi speaks of
emotions as transcendent of the self (p. 4) and “markers of a self in transformation and in union with its
Source” (p. 7). Concepts of “self-emptying” (p. 6) and
of our identity being “swallowed up” (p. 11) in Christ’s
identity clearly intimate a dissolution of any presumed
hard boundaries of separation. Instead of self-containment, we contain Christ, and Christ contains us. As
Properzi puts it using Christ’s own words, we abide in
Him and He abides in us, like the vine and its branches
(p. 8). This makes the location of emotion harder to
pin down as the boundaries of identity are fluid and
permeable, and emotions appear to be more shared
or between us than within us. These statements, in

Radical Implication 2:
Emotions Are Relational Phenomena

By locating the way, the truth, and the life of emotion in Christ, Properzi’s article implicates a seismic
shift from what has been a long history of atomistic
conceptions of emotion to a relational conception of
emotion. Atomism is an ancient concept developed
originally by the Greek philosophers Leucippus and
Democritus, who postulated that the universe consists
of tiny bits of matter and empty space. They named
the tiny bits of matter “atoms” and asserted that atoms contain within themselves the properties that are
needed to explain them. Empty space has no substance
and no properties and therefore cannot contribute to
the makeup of the material world or to explanations
of reality.
In psychology, the chief atom of concern has traditionally been the individual. Individuals are thought
to contain within themselves the substances and properties needed for their explanation as well as for the
explanation of any larger social groups they compose.
The space between individuals, because it is empty of
any material, is assumed to have no qualities in itself
and is therefore incapable of contributing to psychological explanation. Given this perspective, it is not
surprising that psychologists locate emotions within
individuals, emerging from the material that makes
them up. Emotions are regulated and expressed by
the self. This self-containment perspective is at the
heart of the issues Properzi discusses throughout his
paper. Concepts of expressive individualism, identity
politics, radical autonomy, narcissism, authenticity,
subjectivity, self-determination, personal truth, and
so on can exist and have currency in psychology and
the public marketplace of ideas only if an underlying
atomism is assumed.
Therapy, too, is suffused with atomism. Therapists
often teach clients to reframe their emotional expressions in ways that implicate self-containment. When a
21
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contrast with those connoting self-containment, make
it difficult to discern just how relational Properzi’s
concepts of emotion, identity, and truth are. Certainly,
if the truth is a person, if emotions are inseparable
from that person, and if our identity can be swallowed
up in the identity of the person, then all these things
are more relational than atomistic. However, there are
weak conceptions of relationality that assume atomism (Slife & Wiggins, 2009). Properzi leaves the question open as to the strength of the relationality in his
Christ-centered approach.
If Properzi intends a strongly relational theism, then
the implications for the psychology of emotion would
be significant. First, a strongly relational Christian
theism assumes that we are always and already in a
relationship with Christ and therefore are never selfcontained separate beings (Reber & Slife, 2013a). Our
identity, then, is at least in part dependent upon Christ.
The statement from Neal Maxwell quoted by Properzi
(p. 11) demonstrates this point clearly. Maxwell states
that the only thing that is uniquely our own possession is our will. Everything else comes from God. So
who we are has everything to do with our relationship
with Christ, and consequently our emotions cannot
be understood apart from that relationship. Our very
capacity to feel, express, and understand emotion depends upon Christ.
Second, emotions are relational phenomena that
happen between us as much as they do within us. I
am reminded of Martin Buber’s statement that “spirit
is not like the blood that circulates within you but like
the air in which you breathe” (1958, p. 39). This simile
resonates with us when we think of moments of deep
empathy in which we have taken into ourselves other
people’s emotions—sometimes when we do not even
want to—and we experience a degree of merging of
self and other (Cuff, Brown, Taylor, & Howat, 2016).
Many Christian scriptures reinforce this relational notion of emotions being like the air in which we breathe.
“We love Him because He first loved us” (1 John 4:19)
connotes a breathing in of His love that allows us to
exhale His love back. In Matthew 6:22, we learn that
His light can enter the eye and fill the whole body.
Self-emptying and taking into us “the bread of life”
( John 6:35) and “the fountain of living water” ( Jeremiah 2:13) suggests an exhalation of the air of the
natural man and an inhalation of the Spirit. Similarly,

when we breathe out the emotions of a fallen world
and breathe in the emotions of Christ, His emotions
become for those moments of inhalation a part of our
being and identity.
Third, emotions ensue from the way in which we relate to each other, just as the fruits of the Spirit that
Properzi mentions (p. 9) follow from our will being
swallowed up in Christ’s will. In this sense, statements
like “my wife makes me angry” and “I feel angry when
my wife does x, y, or z” are both problematic. Anger
between husband and wife is not a product of a billiard ball causality between the atoms of individual
selves, but it also is not a wholly independent agentic
act of the individuals involved. Instead, it is the fruit
that will most likely grow out of a relationship that is
contextually constrained in a particular way. That is,
the way in which husband and wife are presently and
historically positioned in relation to each other and
the broader culture discloses or illuminates anger as a
“specially favored mode of resolution” (Merleau-Ponty,
2002, pp. 441–442), or a way of being and relating to
each other around sensitive topics, like the handling of
family finances. This is not unlike the way in which a
door has become the specially favored way of exiting a
room in our society as opposed to a window or a wall,
or how a knife and fork are specially favored utensils
for eating steak and potatoes in American culture as
opposed to eating with one’s hands or chopsticks.
It is important to note that we are not compelled
to exit rooms by the door, or to eat meat and potatoes with forks and knives, or to get angry with our
spouse. We could do otherwise. However, given the
constraints of the context, we are highly inclined toward doing and feeling what is physically, societally,
and relationally favored. This is particularly true in
cases of trauma. The former world heavyweight champion boxer Mike Tyson once said that “everyone has
a plan until they get punched in the mouth” (as cited
in Berardino, 2012), meaning that the experience of
a trauma can narrow the constraints of a context so
strongly that all other possibilities than the one most
favored (e.g., fight or flight) will fade away. Indeed,
when traumas like physical and sexual assault, abuse,
violence, and combat occur and/or are recalled, the
only emotional air available to breathe in within that
context is often that of fear, anger, shame, and sorrow.
22
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The Book of Mormon prophet Nephi, who on several occasions was traumatized by his brothers Laman and Lemuel, could not help but breathe in his
brothers’ anger. As a result, he found himself feeling
similarly angry toward them. As he describes the
constraints of his context and the air in which he
was forced to breathe at that time, he notes that “I
am encompassed about, because of the temptations
and the sins which do so easily beset me” (2 Nephi
4:18, The Book of Mormon). Nephi’s words, “do so
easily beset me,” and Merleau-Ponty’s words, “specially
favored modes of resolution,” can be taken as synonyms
here. They both show how powerfully context can
influence our feelings. Later in that same chapter,
Nephi utters a prayer in which he begs his Father in
Heaven to “encircle me around in the robe of thy righteousness” (2 Nephi 4:33). This request is in direct
contrast with being “encompassed about,” because
of temptations and sins. In Buber’s terms Nephi is
crying out for the Lord’s context—for His merciful
and redeeming air to breathe in—so he can exhale
the anger he holds within him and inhale the love
of God. Similarly, from a Christ-centered perspective on emotion, disciples of Christ, recognizing how
easily emotions do beset us in the relational contexts
of our everyday lives, would desire a close redeeming relationship with Christ as often as possible. In
those moments in which intimate connection with
our Savior is achieved—when we are encircled by His
air—then, as Nephi’s prayer illustrates, emotions like
charity will be specially favored over other emotions,
like anger, and are most likely to ensue.

the self-contained individual and locates them in the
relational air in which we breathe or in what Einstein
and Infeld (1938) referred to as “the field in the space
between” (p. 244). Physicists of the 20th century discovered that the “space between” physical matter is not
empty of properties, as atomists had long supposed. It
is full of qualities that contribute to phenomena and
are necessary for scientific explanation.
When, as Properzi describes, we abide in Christ and
He abides in us, “the field in the space between” us is
filled with His spirit and with His divine emotions.
As we submit our will to His and breathe in His spirit
and His emotions, then it is Christ and His emotions
that master us, guide our thoughts and actions, and
suffuse our relationships. At the same time, Christ
breathes in whatever feelings we exhale in repentance
and faith. Through His atoning mercy He can redeem
our emotions, sanctify them as only a God can, and
breathe them back to us anew. Then like the disciples
on the road to Emmaus, our hearts will burn within
us, and we can love with His love. In this way neither
reason nor personal emotions hold the reins. It is not
an intrapersonal mastery dynamic at all. It is interpersonal. Christ’s emotions, like His spirit and His reason,
guide and direct us under His yoke and His burden,
which is light.
This theistic relational mastery discourse has significant implications for psychology and especially for therapy. Rather than endeavor to help clients gain control
of their emotions by training them to think more rationally or by accepting and expressing their emotions
as personal, inviolable truths, therapists would seek to
support and strengthen a closer relationship between
their clients and Christ. Therapists would assist their
clients in self-emptying and submitting their will to
the will of the Savior. They would help their clients
walk a path of discipleship in which they share the air
with Christ and can breathe in His emotions and yield
to His will.

Radical Implication 3: Neither Reason Nor
Emotions Are Our Master

If Properzi’s Christ-centered approach to emotions
is strongly relational and strongly theistic, then it suggests a radical alternative to the mastery discourse of
modernism in which the rational mind is supposed to
reign in the passions. It also runs counter to the rising
mastery discourse Properzi describes so well, in which
one’s personal feelings—and the expression of those
feelings—reign supreme over all else. Both of these
mastery discourses are really just different sides of the
same atomistic coin. A relational ontology of emotions,
on the other hand, displaces reason and emotion from
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